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Abstract 
   
This study examines the European stock market reaction to sixteen events associated with the 
adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in Europe.  European IFRS 
adoption represented a major milestone towards financial reporting convergence yet spurred 
controversy reaching the highest levels of government.  We find a more positive reaction for 
firms with lower quality pre-adoption information, which is more pronounced in banks, and with 
higher pre-adoption information asymmetry, consistent with investors expecting net information 
quality benefits from IFRS adoption.  We also find that the reaction is less positive for firms 
domiciled in code law countries, consistent with investors’ concerns over enforcement of IFRS 
in those countries.  Finally, we find a positive reaction to IFRS adoption events for firms with 
high quality pre-adoption information, consistent with investors expecting net convergence 
benefits from IFRS adoption.  Overall, the findings suggest that investors in European firms 
perceived net benefits associated with IFRS adoption. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This study examines the European stock market reaction to events associated with the 
2005 adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in Europe.
1  Prior to 2005, 
most European firms applied domestic accounting standards.  Thus, the adoption of IFRS in 
Europe represented one of the largest financial reporting changes in recent years and was 
controversial, generating debate that reached the highest levels of government.  The adoption of 
IFRS as issued by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) would result in the 
application of a common set of financial reporting standards within Europe, and between Europe 
and the many other countries that require or permit application of IFRS.  Thus, the debate was 
about not only the benefits and costs of IFRS adoption itself, but also the global financial 
reporting convergence implications if IFRS were modified as a result of the adoption process.
2  
Modifying IFRS would result in European standards differing from those used in other countries, 
thereby eliminating some potential convergence benefits.  We refer to the adoption of IFRS as 
issued by the IASB as the adoption of IFRS – adoption of modified standards is not adoption of 
IFRS.  It is unclear how investors in European firms would react to this anticipated change in 
financial reporting.  This study examines these reactions. 
It is possible that investors in European firms would react positively to movement 
towards IFRS adoption if, for example, investors expected application of IFRS to result in higher 
quality financial reporting information, thereby lowering information asymmetry between the 
                                                 
1 We examine market reactions in all stock markets in Europe.  Throughout, we refer to these markets collectively as 
the European stock market.  Also, we examine market reactions for firms trading in the European stock market.  
Throughout, we refer to these firms as European firms. 
2 For example, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) recently eliminated the requirement for cross-
listed firms that prepare their financial statements using IFRS as issued by the IASB to reconcile net income and 
shareholders’ equity from those based on IFRS to those based on US standards.  The SEC did not propose to 
eliminate the requirement for cross-listed firms that use IFRS as modified by any particular jurisdiction, including 
the European Union.  
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firm and investors and information risk and, thus, cost of capital.  Investors also might have 
believed that application of a common set of standards would have convergence benefits, such as 
lowering the costs of comparing firms’ financial position and performance across countries, and 
that IFRS adoption would enable European capital markets to become more globally 
competitive, with consequent increases in liquidity for European firms.  Alternatively, it is 
possible that investors in European firms would react negatively to movement towards IFRS 
adoption.  This could be the case if investors believed that IFRS would result in lower quality 
financial reporting information.  For example, IFRS might not adequately reflect regional 
differences in economies that led to differences in domestic accounting standards.  Also, 
investors might have believed that potential variation in the implementation and enforcement of 
IFRS would lead to an increase in the exercise of opportunistic managerial discretion when 
applying IFRS.  Finally, investors might have believed that the implementation and transition 
costs associated with IFRS would exceed any benefits.   
To gain insight into investors’ expectations regarding the net cost or benefit of IFRS 
adoption in Europe, we examine three-day market-adjusted returns for the portfolio of all firms 
with equity traded in the European stock market centered on sixteen events that we assess as 
affecting the likelihood of IFRS adoption in Europe.  We find that, in aggregate, investors 
reacted positively to the increased likelihood of IFRS adoption.  We also find that this aggregate 
reaction derives from both a positive reaction to the thirteen events that we assess increased the 
likelihood of IFRS adoption and a negative reaction to the three events that we assess decreased 
it.  Taken together, these findings are consistent with equity investors in European firms 
perceiving that the expected benefits of IFRS adoption exceeded the expected costs.  
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To assess whether investors reacted differently to IFRS adoption events as a function of 
firms’ information asymmetry and accounting standards enforcement, as well as their pre-
adoption information quality, we estimate the cross-sectional relation between firms’ event 
returns and proxies for these characteristics.  We find a larger positive reaction for firms with 
lower pre-adoption information quality, which is consistent with investors expecting that IFRS 
adoption will result in greater informational benefits for these firms.  We find an even larger 
positive reaction for banks – but only those banks with lower pre-adoption information quality.  
This is consistent with investors expecting that IFRS will result in a greater improvement in 
information quality for these banks, perhaps reflecting perceived net benefits associated with 
adoption of the controversial International Accounting Standard (IAS) 39, Financial 
Instruments: Recognition and Measurement.  We also find a larger positive reaction for firms 
with higher pre-adoption information asymmetry, which is consistent with investors expecting 
that IFRS adoption will mitigate this asymmetry.  Finally, we find a less positive reaction for 
firms domiciled in code law countries.  Although we cannot derive definitive inferences from 
this finding, it is consistent with investors harboring concerns regarding implementation of IFRS 
in countries that are generally thought to have weaker accounting standards enforcement.   
Further analyses reveal a positive reaction to IFRS adoption events for the subset of 
European firms with the highest quality pre-adoption information.  To the extent investors expect 
little, if any, informational benefits from IFRS adoption for these firms, this finding is consistent 
with investors expecting net benefits associated with convergence.  Sensitivity analyses reveal 
that our results are robust to alternative proxies for information quality, measures of standards 
enforcement environments, and benchmark returns.    
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II discusses the background 
of IFRS adoption in Europe.  Section III reviews prior research and provides the basis for 
interpreting the market reaction to each event.  Section IV describes our data and research 
design.  Section V presents our empirical results, and Section VI presents sensitivity analyses.  
Section VII concludes.  
 
II. BACKGROUND 
European Union Adoption Process 
We focus on the European Union (EU) adoption of IFRS because the EU comprises most 
countries in Europe.
3  In March 2002, the European Parliament passed a resolution requiring all 
firms listed on stock exchanges of European member states to apply IFRS when preparing their 
financial statements for fiscal years beginning on or after January 1, 2005.  This requirement 
affected approximately 7,000 firms.
4  The prospects of adopting IFRS represented a substantial 
shift in financial reporting for European firms because many requirements in IFRS differ from 
those in domestic standards of European countries.  Also, the adoption of IFRS in Europe 
reflects an EU goal of achieving capital market integration; it is a necessary step towards 
convergence of financial reporting not only across Europe, but also between Europe and the rest 
of the world.  Although the resolution requires firms to use IFRS, which are issued by the IASB, 
a private-sector standard setter, the European Commission (EC) must endorse the standards 
before they are required in the EU.  Thus, the EC retains the power to reject any standard, or part 
                                                 
3 The exceptions are Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway, which are members of the European Economic Area 
(EEA), and Switzerland.  Members of the EEA are committed to following EU Directives, including those relating 
to IFRS adoption.  Switzerland is centrally located in Europe and, thus, has close economic ties with other European 
countries.  Effective in 2005, Switzerland required all listed firms to use either IFRS or US standards.  Presumably 
its decision was related to that of the EU.  Thus, our sample includes firms in Norway and Switzerland; no firms in 
Liechtenstein or Iceland met our data requirements.  Because Switzerland is not committed to following EU 
Directives, we conducted all of our tests omitting Swiss firms with no change in our inferences.  
4 The required adoption date is January 1, 2007 for firms trading securities in the US and basing their financial 
statements on US standards, and firms trading debt securities but not equity securities.  
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of a standard, it believes does not meet its criteria for endorsement.  The three primary criteria 
are: the standard is not contrary to the EU’s true and fair principle; the standard meets the criteria 
of understandability, relevance, reliability, and comparability; and adopting the standard is in the 
European public interest.   
The EC endorsement process, which played a key role in the adoption of IFRS in Europe, 
is as follows (Brackney and Witmer 2005; KPMG IFRG Limited 2005).  The IASB develops 
IFRS in accordance with due process procedures outlined in its governing constitution (IASB 
2006).  This process involves public meetings and extensive input from interested parties around 
the world.  Among these is the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG), a 
private-sector organization comprised of accounting experts from the EU, which provides advice 
to the EC regarding technical accounting matters.  After the IASB issues a standard, EFRAG 
reviews it and, after public consultation, EFRAG decides whether to recommend that the EC 
endorse the standard for use in Europe.  Taking EFRAG’s advice into account, the EC drafts 
proposed regulation.  The EC then seeks input from the Accounting Regulatory Committee 
(ARC).  The ARC, a governmental organization comprised of representatives from each EU 
member state, reviews the regulation and provides its recommendation about adoption in the EU.  
The ARC considers the technical merits of the standard as expressed in EFRAG’s 
recommendation letter, as well as the implications of the standard for the European public 
interest.  If the ARC recommends endorsement, the EC then decides whether to endorse the 
standard, as written by the IASB or as amended, or to reject it.  If endorsed, the standard 
becomes regulation applicable to firms in the EU.  If the ARC recommends rejection of the  
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standard, the EC can ask EFRAG to consider it further, or send it to the European Parliament for 
a decision.
5  
The debate surrounding the adoption of IFRS in Europe initially focused on the merits of 
adopting IFRS, such as whether the benefits of the expected increased capital flows would 
outweigh the costs of implementation and lost diversity in domestic accounting standards.  The 
debate later centered on IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement and, to a 
lesser extent, on IAS 32 Financial Instruments: Disclosure and Presentation.  The provisions in 
these two standards, particularly IAS 39, had the potential to materially affect financial statement 
amounts for firms with a large number of financial instruments, notably banks.  The debate 
regarding IAS 39 ultimately led to the modification of IAS 39 for adoption in Europe.  
Modifications to IAS 39, or any other IASB standard, undermine the EU’s goal of adopting 
global standards. 
Regarding IAS 39, the controversy focused on two types of requirements.  The first 
relates to the requirement to use fair value as the measurement attribute.  IAS 39 requires many 
financial instruments – notably derivatives – to be recognized at fair value, with changes in fair 
value recognized in profit or loss.
6  Also, IAS 39 includes a fair value option, which permits 
firms to designate financial instruments irrevocably on initial recognition as ones to be measured 
at fair value with changes in fair value recognized in profit or loss.  The second relates to 
                                                 
5 The process can apply to a single standard or to a group of standards.  For the initial endorsement of IFRS in 
Europe, the extant set of standards was considered as a group.  Specifically, the EC considered all standards 
effective at March 1, 2002, which included IAS 1 through IAS 41, as well as the related Standing Interpretations 
Committee (SIC) interpretations, i.e., SIC 1 through SIC 33. 
6 IAS 39 classifies financial assets into (1) loans and receivables not held for trading; (2) held-to-maturity 
investments; (3) financial instruments held for trading, including derivatives; and (4) available-for-sale financial 
assets.  Financial assets in (1), (2), (3), and (4) are recognized at, respectively, amortized cost; amortized cost subject 
to impairment; fair value with changes in fair value recognized in profit or loss; and fair value with changes in fair 
value recognized in other comprehensive income.  Most financial liabilities are recognized at cost, except 
derivatives and liabilities held for trading, which are recognized at fair value with changes in fair value recognized 
in profit or loss.  
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qualifying criteria for hedge accounting – IAS 39’s qualifying criteria are specific and not easy 
to satisfy.  Hedge accounting generally results in gains (losses) on a hedged item and losses 
(gains) on a designated hedging instrument being recognized in profit or loss at the same time to 
the extent the gains (losses) on the hedged item result from the hedged risk(s).  Thus, hedge 
accounting reduces volatility in profit or loss resulting from, e.g., measuring derivatives entered 
into for hedging purposes at fair value and measuring the hedged item at amortized cost.  
However, IAS 39 does not permit hedge accounting for many financial instruments ostensibly 
entered into for hedging purposes.  For example, IAS 39 does not permit hedge accounting for 
interest rate risk associated with core demand deposits; European banks commonly state that 
they hedge this risk.  For many European firms, the fair value and hedging requirements in IAS 
39 differ substantially from requirements in their domestic standards.  In fact, most European 
domestic standards do not include standards specifying the financial reporting for many financial 
instruments.   
 
IFRS Adoption Events  
Although the adoption of IFRS was an involved process with considerable discussion, we 
identify sixteen specific events between 2002 and 2005 that we assess as affecting the likelihood 
that IFRS would be adopted in Europe.  We identify the events by searching Dow Jones News 
Retrieval using the terms “IFRS,” “international financial reporting standards,” “harmonization,” 
and “IAS 39,” as well as by examining press releases and available listings of documents 
publicly released by the IASB, the European Parliament, the EC, and EFRAG.  This search 
provided an initial listing of approximately forty events.  Each author independently verified 
each event’s timing, content, and likely directional effect on IFRS adoption likelihood.  Each 
author then independently identified the events that likely had the greatest effect on IFRS  
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adoption likelihood; events that simply confirmed an earlier event were eliminated.  Table 1 lists 
the resulting sixteen events and our assessment as to whether each event increased or decreased 
adoption likelihood.  We assess thirteen events as increasing the likelihood of IFRS adoption and 
three events as decreasing it.  Our assessment of each event’s directional effect on adoption 
likelihood reflects our assessment of how the event likely affected investors’ expectations 
conditional on prior events and discussions, and enables us to aggregate the market reaction 
across events.  
The first event is March 12, 2002, when the European Parliament passed the resolution 
requiring all firms listed on stock exchanges in the EU to apply IFRS by 2005.  The resolution 
passed by a vote of 429 for, 5 against, and 29 abstentions, indicating broad support for adoption 
of IFRS.  Even though convergence towards international standards had been under 
consideration in Europe prior to 2002, we use the March 12, 2002 resolution as our first event 
because passage of the resolution was the first clear commitment to IFRS adoption.
7  On May 14, 
2002 and June 19, 2002, EFRAG issued its draft and final recommendations that extant IFRS be 
endorsed en bloc.  The endorsement recommendation letters stated EFRAG’s view that the 
regulation requiring European firms to adopt IFRS by 2005 is a major achievement in that the 
common basis for financial reporting based on high quality global standards provides a platform 
for efficient cross-border investment both within and beyond the EU.  EFRAG further noted that 
the IASB is reviewing several standards with the objective of making some improvements to 
them; EFRAG will consider those changes and make its recommendation on them after the IASB 
                                                 
7 Prior research finds little (Comprix et al. 2003) or limited (Pae et al. 2007) evidence of a market reaction to IFRS 
adoption events before March 12, 2002.  These findings suggest that investors’ IFRS adoption expectations were not 
affected by events prior to the March 12, 2002 resolution, the studied events were not those that affected investors’ 
expectations, or the event windows were too narrow to capture the market reaction to the events.  Nonetheless, our 
findings may only partially capture the market reaction to EU IFRS adoption to the extent that events prior to March 
12, 2002 affected investors’ expectations about the European Parliament’s resolution.  The direction of any bias 
arising from the omission of such events is unclear.   
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issues them.  These three events reflected clear support for the broad adoption of IFRS.  
Therefore, we assess these events as increasing the likelihood of IFRS adoption in Europe.  
During the remainder of 2002 and into 2003 the EC considered whether to accept 
EFRAG’s recommendation to endorse extant IFRS.  On July 4, 2003, Jacques Chirac, President 
of France, wrote a letter to Romano Prodi, President of the EC, to express concern that adopting 
IFRS, particularly IAS 39, would not be in the best interest of Europe.  Chirac’s interest in the 
debate arose at least in part because French banks were among the most critical of IAS 39.  
Chirac’s involvement showed IFRS-related concern at the highest level of government.  
Therefore, we assess this event as decreasing the likelihood of IFRS adoption. 
On July 9, 2003, Frits Bolkestein, the EC commissioner responsible for internal markets, 
expressed to Sir David Tweedie, Chairman of the IASB, similar concern about IAS 39, but 
expressed support for the broader goal of convergence using IFRS.  On July 16, 2003, the ARC 
and the EU’s Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN), which is comprised of the 
Economics and Finance ministers of the EU member states, echoed Bolkestein’s support for 
adoption of IFRS, despite also echoing his concern about IAS 39.  On September 29, 2003, the 
EC endorsed all extant IFRS, except IAS 32 and IAS 39.  Even though all of these events reflect 
concern about IAS 39, they all expressed clear support for IFRS adoption and the desire to work 
to resolve in the near term the remaining issues relating to IAS 39.  Therefore, we assess these 
three events as increasing the likelihood of IFRS adoption. 
After the EC’s endorsement of most extant IFRS, the debate seemingly focused on IAS 
32 and IAS 39, although the debate also reflected the possibility that the EU would amend IASB-
issued standards – and the implications this might have for the adoption of future standards by 
the EU.  Although the IASB revised IAS 39 in December 2003, the revisions did not resolve the  
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controversial issues relating to the fair value option and hedge accounting requirements.  Thus, 
the endorsement of IAS 32 and IAS 39 remained uncertain. 
On February 3, 2004, Bolkestein indicated his intention to continue postponing 
endorsement of IAS 32 and IAS 39 until the issues could be resolved.  To facilitate resolution, he 
announced establishment of a high level consultative group.  On March 30, 2004, HSBC, the 
largest European bank, expressed its support for adoption by announcing its plans to implement 
IAS 39 in full, regardless of whether the EC endorsed it.  On June 4, 2004, EFRAG issued draft 
recommendations to endorse IAS 32 and IAS 39.  Although the IAS 32 recommendation was 
unanimous, 6 of 11 EFRAG members voted against the IAS 39 recommendation.  A majority 
negative vote is insufficient for EFRAG to recommend non-endorsement of a standard – the 
EFRAG constitution requires a two-thirds negative vote.  On July 8, 2004, EFRAG issued its 
final recommendations to endorse IAS 32 and IAS 39, both based on the same votes as the draft 
recommendations.  Although each of these events continued to reflect concern regarding IAS 39, 
the actions taken by Bolkestein to resolve the conflicts, the support of IAS 39 by a major 
European bank, and EFRAG’s recommended endorsement of IAS 39 all reflected events that 
likely increased the likelihood of IFRS adoption.  Thus, we assess them as such. 
On October 1, 2004, the ARC added its endorsement recommendation to that of EFRAG.  
However, the ARC did not recommend endorsement of IAS 39 as issued by the IASB.  Rather, 
the ARC recommended that the EC “carve out” of IAS 39 the two parts of the standard that were 
the focus of the controversy.  Endorsing IAS 39 with this carve-out would mean that IFRS as 
applied in Europe would differ from IFRS applied elsewhere in the world, thereby thwarting the 
goal of global convergence described in the 2002 EFRAG endorsement recommendation letters.  
On November 19, 2004, the EC followed the ARC recommendation and endorsed a carve-out  
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version of IAS 39.  Because these two events indicated that the EC was willing to alter IFRS, we 
assess these events as decreasing the likelihood of IFRS adoption. 
The EC indicated its intention that the carve-outs be temporary, only in place until the 
technical controversies were resolved.  On June 16, 2005, the IASB revised the fair value option 
in IAS 39, and on July 8, 2005 ARC recommended endorsement of it.  The EC endorsed the 
revised fair value option on November 15, 2005, thereby eliminating one of the two carve-outs 
of IAS 39.
8  Because these three events supported the EC’s intention to eliminate the carve-outs 
and made IFRS as endorsed in the EU closer to IFRS as issued by the IASB, we assess these 
events as increasing the likelihood of IFRS adoption. 
 
III. PRIOR RESEARCH AND EXPECTED MARKET REACTION 
Little is known about how investors perceived the possibility of IFRS adoption in Europe.  
This study infers investor perceptions by examining the equity market reaction to events leading 
to the adoption.  Prior research uses this approach to assess US investor perceptions regarding 
individual standards (e.g., fair value accounting in SFAS 115 by Beatty et al. 1996 and Cornett et 
al. 1996; and stock-based compensation accounting in SFAS 123 by Dechow et al. 1996).  
However, our setting, which investigates investor perceptions regarding an entire set of 
accounting standards, is perhaps more analogous to prior research that has examined investor 
perceptions to broad pieces of legislation (e.g., the Sarbanes-Oxley Act by Jain and Rezaee 2006, 
Zhang 2007, and Li et al. 2008).  
It is unclear how investors in European firms would react to movement towards IFRS 
adoption.  It is possible that investors would react positively to movement towards IFRS 
adoption if, for example, they expect application of IFRS to result in higher quality financial 
                                                 
8 As of the writing of this manuscript, the second carve-out relating to hedge accounting remains in place.  
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reporting relative to application of domestic standards, thereby enhancing financial reporting 
transparency, reducing information asymmetry and information risk and, thus, lowering cost of 
capital.  This prediction is supported by prior research.  For example, Barth et al. (2008) finds 
that application of International Accounting Standards (IAS), which comprise a large portion of 
extant IFRS, is associated with higher quality accounting amounts than application of non-US 
domestic standards.  Similarly, Karamanou and Nishiotis (2005) finds positive abnormal returns 
for a small set of non-US firms announcing voluntary adoption of IAS between 1989 and 1999.  
Diamond and Verrecchia (1991), Baiman and Verrecchia (1996), Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), 
and Barth et al. (2007), among others, find that higher financial reporting quality is associated 
with lower cost of capital.  These studies are consistent with Aboody et al. (2004) and Easley and 
O’Hara (2004), which provide evidence that information risk is priced and, thus, its perceived 
reduction could result in a detectable market reaction.   
Investors might also react positively to movement towards IFRS adoption if they expect 
application of IFRS to have positive cash flow effects.  These effects could include reduced 
contracting costs (e.g., Beatty et al. 1996) or reduced scope for managerial rent extraction 
associated with greater financial reporting transparency (e.g., Hope et al. 2006).  It is also 
possible that investors in European firms would react positively to movement towards IFRS if 
they believed that IFRS would provide convergence benefits.  For example, Barth et al. (1999) 
finds that there can be positive market effects associated with convergence.
9  Similarly, 
Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001) finds that previous convergence efforts relating to IAS resulted in 
reductions in analyst forecasts errors.  Pae et al. (2007) finds that firm values, reflected in 
                                                 
9 Barth et al. (1999) shows that the net market effect of convergence is a function of two effects.  The first is the 
direct informational effect, i.e., whether convergence increases or decreases accounting quality.  The second is the 
expertise acquisition effect, i.e., whether investors become experts in foreign accounting, which depends on how 
costly it is to develop the expertise.  Therefore, ex ante the net market effect of convergence is uncertain.  
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Tobin’s Q, increased after the passage of EU regulations intended to converge financial 
reporting, particularly for firms with higher agency costs.   
Alternatively, it is possible that investors in European firms would react negatively to 
movement towards IFRS if, for example, they believed that IFRS would decrease financial 
reporting quality.  This could occur if investors believed that IFRS would fail to either 
adequately reflect regional differences in economies or accommodate countries’ differing 
political and economic features that led to existing differences in domestic accounting 
standards.
10  Investors might also believe that variation in the implementation and enforcement 
of IFRS could lead to an increase in opportunistic managerial discretion when applying IFRS.  
Ball (1995, 2006) and Daske et al. (2007), among others, point out that effective financial 
reporting convergence requires consistent implementation and enforcement of standards.  Unlike 
the SEC in the US, there was no regulatory counterpart with enforcement authority that spanned 
the European member states to ensure consistent application of IFRS.  Consistent with factors 
other than standards themselves affecting financial reporting quality, Ball et al. (2003) reports no 
detectable information quality difference between East Asian firms with high quality, i.e., 
common law-based, accounting standards and those with low quality, i.e., code law-based, 
accounting standards.  There is also evidence that substantial information quality differences 
within Europe remain even after convergence efforts that preceded the 2005 IFRS adoption EU 
mandate (e.g., Tay and Parker 1990; Joos and Lang 1994).  Investors might also have believed 
that any convergence benefits arising from adoption of IFRS would be less than the costs to 
implement and transition to the new set of standards.   
 
 
                                                 
10 For example, relative to domestic standards, IFRS generally relies on a greater use of fair values, which some 
believe is more susceptible to opportunistic managerial discretion than are modified historical cost-based amounts.  
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IV. DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
We infer investor perceptions relating to IFRS adoption by examining European firms’ 
equity return reactions to our sixteen adoption events.  We first provide evidence on the overall 
market reaction to these events.  We then focus our tests on determining whether particular firm 
characteristics explain cross-sectional variation in firms’ return reactions in a manner consistent 
with our predictions.  Because the adoption of IFRS resulted from a process that evolved over 
several years, we draw our inferences from analyses of the market reactions associated with all 
sixteen events taken together, rather than with each event separately.  
Our tests are based on an event-study research design, which relies on a degree of equity 
market efficiency in the sample countries that is sufficient to ensure the information related to 
each event is reflected in equity prices within the event window in an unbiased manner.  In 
particular, the maintained hypothesis throughout our analysis is that equity prices reflect 
unbiased expectations of the costs and benefits of IFRS adoption conditional on available 
information.  Although the size and liquidity of the European equity market suggests this is a 
tenable assumption, there is likely variation across markets within Europe during our sample 
period.  If a sample country’s equity market is not sufficiently efficient to reflect event 
information within the event window, our tests can lack power or be biased (e.g., Hirshleifer 
2001).   
Our tests also rely on both the correct identification of information events and there being 
no confounding news during the event windows.
11  Including non-events likely introduces noise 
and excluding relevant events likely reduces power; both can introduce bias.  Our event selection 
procedures, described in Section II, are intended to minimize the likelihood of including non-
                                                 
11 See Chapter 4 of Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997) for a detailed discussion of the assumptions and 
limitations of an event-study research design.  
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events and excluding relevant events.  Regarding potentially confounding news, we search the 
US and European editions of the Wall Street Journal, including “World Markets” articles, and 
the European edition of the Financial Times for non-IFRS related news during each event 
window.  We observe other news within nearly all event windows.  However, there is no 
discernible pattern of good (bad) news during event windows for events that we assess as 
increasing (decreasing) the likelihood of IFRS adoption.  That is, we do not observe a systematic 
alternative news pattern that would bias our inferences.   
 
Overall Market Reaction 
Our tests of the overall market reaction to IFRS adoption in Europe focus on event 
returns for a value-weighted portfolio of the 3,265 European firms for which data are available 
for all sixteen events in Table 1.
12  Table 2 provides a classification of the sample by country.  
We obtain daily price data between 2002 and 2005 from Datastream through Thomson One 
Banker Analytic.   
We base our tests on European firms’ three-day value-weighted market-adjusted returns 
centered on each of the sixteen event dates, CMARe, where e = 1 to 16.  To capture any global 
economic effects occurring concurrent with our event dates, we market adjust the returns by 
subtracting the corresponding three-day return to the Dow Jones STOXX Global 1800 Index 
excluding the 600 European firms in the index (DJ STOXX 1800 ex Europe, hereafter).  That is, 
we use the index of the 1,200 largest firms, based on market capitalization, domiciled in the 
Americas and Asia.
13   
                                                 
12 Relaxing the requirement that data are available for all sixteen events does not alter our inferences.  
13 The Dow Jones STOXX Global 1800 Index (DJ STOXX 1800, hereafter) represents the largest 600 firms, based 
on free float market capitalization, from each of Europe, North and South America, and the Asia/Pacific region.  The 
index’s stated objective is to “provide a broad yet investable representation of the world’s developed markets.”  We 
tabulate results using the DJ STOXX 1800 ex Europe Index because this benchmark is less likely than the DJ  
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We construct portfolio event returns by value weighting each firm’s return based on the 
firm’s equity market value at the end of the most recent quarter prior to the event.  We draw 
inferences using portfolio return statistics because portfolio estimates are robust to potential 
cross-sectional correlation (Sefcik and Thompson 1986); that is, the portfolio approach assumes 
perfect correlation between firms’ returns in each event window, which results in a conservative 
test by limiting the power to detect statistical significance.  Because we assess some events as 
increasing and some as decreasing the likelihood of IFRS adoption, we multiply the latter by 
minus one when our tests require aggregating returns for both types of events so that an 
aggregate positive return is consistent with our predictions. 
We conduct three tests to assess the significance of the portfolio event returns.  The first 
is a t-test of whether the mean of the sixteen event portfolio CMARes differs from zero.  This test 
assumes that our market adjustment is the proper benchmark for the expected market return and, 
thus, the expected market-adjusted return equals zero.  The standard deviation used in the test is 
derived from the distribution of the sixteen portfolio event returns.  Consistent with Fama and 
MacBeth (1973), we assume portfolio returns associated with different events are uncorrelated.   
The second is a t-test for whether the mean of the sixteen event portfolio CMARes differs 
from the mean of a distribution of similarly constructed non-event portfolio returns.  This test 
assumes unequal variances for the event and non-event return distributions.  We conduct this test 
because it admits the possibility that returns of European firms differ systematically from returns 
of firms in other regions.  That is, the test does not assume that our market adjustment fully 
adjusts for the market return.  To the extent returns of European firms do not differ 
systematically from other firms, this test will result in loss of power because it will introduce 
                                                                                                                                                             
STOXX 1800 Index to remove the effect we seek to document.  Untabulated findings reveal that market adjusting 
returns using the DJ STOXX 1800 Index does not affect our inferences.  
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estimation noise.  To form the distribution of non-event returns, we use returns for European 
firms for all days in our event years, 2002 to 2005, that do not overlap with our event windows.  
We calculate the 300 three-day portfolio returns, ensuring non-overlapping windows, and 
subtract the corresponding three-day return to the DJ STOXX 1800 ex Europe Index.
14   
The third test calculates the probability that the mean of the sixteen event portfolio 
CMARes exceeds the mean of sixteen similarly constructed randomly selected non-event 
portfolio returns.  This test assumes the distribution of these non-event returns is the same as the 
distribution of event returns.  It does not rely on any other distributional assumptions.  However, 
to the extent the randomly selected non-event portfolio returns do not reflect the population of 
portfolio returns, there could be noise or bias in this test.  To implement this test, we randomly 
select sixteen non-event portfolio returns from non-event dates that mimic the year-by-year 
distribution of our sample events.  That is, we select three, four, six, and three non-event 
portfolio returns from 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005, respectively.  We then designate one of the 
non-event portfolio returns from 2003 and two from 2004 as being associated with events that 
decrease the likelihood of IFRS adoption.  We then compare the standardized mean of the non-
event portfolio returns to the standardized mean of the sixteen event portfolio CMARes.
15  We 
repeat this procedure 500 times to construct a simulated p-value for the probability that the 
standardized mean non-event portfolio return is greater than the standardized mean portfolio 
CMARe.
16   
                                                 
14 There are approximately 75 non-event three-day windows in each of the four sample years, which results in 300 
non-event return windows.  To ensure that our non-event returns do not overlap with each other, we select every 
fourth trading day as the beginning of the three-day return window.  Our inferences are unaffected by altering the 
starting point for this trading day selection. 
15 We standardize means by dividing the mean return by the standard error of the sixteen event return distribution. 
16 This procedure effectively tests how often our event distribution t-statistic is larger than a t-statistic estimated 
from a similarly constructed distribution of non-event dates.  Bootstrap p-values indicate the likelihood of obtaining 
a similar magnitude statistical rejection of the null hypothesis on non-event dates.  See, for example, Hein and 
Westfall (2004).    
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Cross-Sectional Analysis 
We base our primary inferences on tests of whether firm characteristics explain cross-
sectional variation in the market reaction to IFRS adoption events.  This analysis assumes that 
investors assess the expected costs and benefits of IFRS adoption, including those related to 
accounting information quality, and implementation and transition.  To obtain our inferences, we 
estimate the following equation: 
CMARj,e = β0 + β1 InfoQualFactorj,e + β2 Bankj,e + β3 InfoQualFactorj,e*Bankj,e  
+ β4 Turnoverj,e + β5 CloselyHeldj,e + β6 Herfj,e+ β7 Codej,e + β8 Big4j,e + εj,e.   (1) 
As in our portfolio return tests, when estimating equation (1) we multiply by minus one returns 
associated with events we assess as decreasing the likelihood of IFRS adoption. 
Our proxy for the firm’s pre-adoption information quality is InfoQualFactor, which is the 
first principal component derived from four variables selected to reflect information quality.
17  
The four variables are ADR, an indicator variable that equals one if a firm cross-lists in the US 
using American Depository Receipts (ADR) during the event year, and zero otherwise; 
Standards Applied, an indicator variable that equals one if the firm applies US standards or 
International Accounting Standards (IAS) during the event year, and zero if the firm applied 
domestic standards;
18 Exchanges, the number of exchanges on which the firm is listed during the 
event year; and Size, the natural logarithm of the firm’s prior end of year market value of equity.  
We expect ADR firms to have higher quality pre-adoption information because these firms are 
subject to US securities regulation and enforcement, are required during our sample period to 
reconcile domestic standards-based net income and equity book value to those based on US 
                                                 
17 InfoQualFactor is estimated using varimax orthogonal rotation.  The first and second principal component 
eigenvalues are 1.75 and 0.99, respectively. 
18 Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland permitted firms a 
choice of accounting standards prior to mandatory IFRS adoption.  
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standards, and are typically larger and more widely followed by analysts.
19  We expect that firms 
applying US standards or IAS, firms listed on multiple exchanges, and firms that have larger 
equity market values to have higher quality pre-adoption information.  To ease interpretation, we 
multiply factor scores by minus one so that higher values of InfoQualFactor correspond to lower 
quality information.  If investors perceive the benefits to IFRS adoption are higher for firms with 
lower quality pre-adoption information, then we expect β1 is positive. 
To provide insight into whether the event market reactions reflect perceptions regarding 
IFRS generally or IAS 39 in particular, we include in equation (1) Bank, which is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the firm’s primary two-digit SIC code is 60 or 61, i.e., depository 
institutions and non-depository credit institutions, and zero otherwise.  We include Bank because 
IAS 39 figured prominently in banks’ resistance to EU IFRS adoption.  Investors in banks might 
react more positively than investors in other firms if they perceive informational benefits 
associated with IAS 39, such as those associated with financial statement recognition of 
previously unrecognized derivative financial instruments, leading to a positive predicted sign for 
β2.  However, investors in banks might react more negatively if they perceive that banks would 
incur more IFRS-related transition costs, such as those associated with extensive systems 
changes to account for large portfolios of financial instruments and hedging activities or raising 
the attention of banking regulators if they report more volatile earnings based on IFRS than 
based on their domestic standards.  This would lead to a negative predicted sign for β2.  Thus, we 
do not predict the sign of β2.  Equation (1) also includes the interaction variable 
InfoQualFactor*Bank, which is intended to capture any incremental market reaction for those 
                                                 
19 We identify ADR firm years from the Bank of New York Complete Depository Receipt record 
(http://160.254.123.37/dr_directory.jsp), which indicates both the type and date of the ADR listing.  We use only 
Level II or Level III ADRs, not Level I.  This is because during our sample period firms with Level II and Level III 
ADRs were required to provide domestic-to-US standards-based reconciliations and were subject to more stringent 
requirements than firms with Level I ADRs.  
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banks with lower quality pre-adoption information as reflected in InfoQualFactor.  For reasons 
discussed above, we do not predict the sign of β3. 
Equation (1) also includes three proxies for pre-adoption information asymmetry between 
the firm and investors.  The first is Turnover, which is an indicator variable that equals one if the 
firm’s ratio of average number of daily shares traded to average total number of shares 
outstanding for the year is greater than the sample median, and zero otherwise.  The second is 
CloselyHeld, which is the percentage of shares held by insiders, as provided by Worldscope.  
The third is Herf, which is the Herfindahl index, measured as the sum of squared market shares, 
i.e., percentage of total industry sales, for all firms in the firm’s primary two-digit SIC code.  
Thus, Herf ranges from zero to one, with higher values indicating that within-industry sales are 
concentrated in fewer firms.  We expect that firms with lower turnover, with greater insider 
ownership, and that have less industry competition have more information asymmetry.  If 
investors expect IFRS adoption to reduce information asymmetry, then they will react more 
positively to increases in the likelihood of IFRS adoption for firms with greater pre-adoption 
information asymmetry.  This would be consistent with investors perceiving a reduction in the 
firm’s future cost of capital.  Thus, we expect β4 is negative, and β5 and β6 are positive.  
However, if investors perceive that IFRS adoption will require firms with dominant industry 
market share to disclose proprietary information, then we expect β6 is negative.  
Finally, equation (1) includes two proxies for enforcement and implementation of 
accounting standards.  The first is Code, which is an indicator variable that equals one if a firm is 
domiciled in a code law country, and zero otherwise.
20  Investors may expect that financial 
reporting standards are less stringently enforced in code law countries (Ball et al. 2000, 2003).  
Therefore, firms in code law countries may retain greater flexibility in the application of IFRS.  
                                                 
20 All of our sample countries except the UK and Ireland are classified as code law countries.  
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If this is the case, we expect β7 is negative.  The second is Big4, which is an indicator variable 
that equals one if the firm’s auditor during the fiscal year is one of the four largest, as reported by 
Worldscope, and zero otherwise.  Prior research finds that larger audit firms provide higher 
quality audits (DeAngelo 1981), and that investors perceive and price quality differences 
associated with stronger monitors (e.g., Hogan 1997; Muller and Riedl 2002).  Thus, investors 
may expect larger audit firms to provide more stringent enforcement and have more resources 
available to facilitate IFRS transition.  If this is the case, we expect β8 is positive. 
To account for potential cross-sectional correlation among the residuals from equation 
(1), we calculate two-way clustered standard errors based on two-digit industry and country 
(Rogers 1993; Petersen 2007).
21  We cluster along these two dimensions because it is reasonable 
to assume that financial reporting practices and changes therein are more homogeneous within 
industries and countries than across industries and countries.  
 
V.  RESULTS 
Overall Market Reaction 
Table 3 presents the portfolio returns results.  For each of our sixteen events, we report 
the raw return to the portfolio of 3,265 European firms (column labeled “Market Reaction 
Europe”); the raw return to the portfolio of the 1,200 largest market capitalization firms 
domiciled outside of Europe (column labeled “Market Reaction Rest of World”); and the 
difference between these returns, which is the market-adjusted European return (column labeled 
“Difference”).  Table 3 presents the individual event portfolio returns with their predicted and 
actual signs; none of the individual event portfolio returns is significantly different from zero.   
                                                 
21 All of our inferences are unaffected by clustering on either two-digit industry or country.   
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To compute the mean of the sixteen event returns, at the bottom of the table, we multiply 
by minus one returns associated with events we assess as decreasing the likelihood of IFRS 
adoption.  Thus, we predict that the mean of the portfolio event returns is positive.  We find that 
the mean return associated with the sixteen events for the European portfolio is –0.0052, 
compared to –0.0086 for the rest of the world portfolio.  The difference of 0.0034 is positive, as 
predicted, and significantly different from zero (t-statisticvs0 = 2.627) and significantly different 
from the mean difference for the non-event returns (t-statisticvs300 = 1.980).  Further, bootstrap 
estimation reveals there is less than a one percent chance of randomly drawing sixteen non-event 
returns with a larger standardized mean than that for our sixteen events (p-valuebootstrap = 
0.008).
22   
We also conduct these tests separately on the thirteen events that we assess as increasing 
the likelihood of IFRS adoption, and the three events that we assess as decreasing this likelihood.  
Disaggregating events in this fashion reduces the chance that our event returns reflect spurious 
market reactions to non-IFRS news because such non-IFRS news not only would have to 
coincide with our event dates, but also would have to be of the same sign as we predict for our 
event.  Untabulated results tend to support our inferences.  In particular, for the thirteen events 
increasing adoption likelihood, untabulated results reveal a mean positive market-adjusted 
reaction of 0.0030.  t-statisticvs0 (1.896) and p-valuebootstrap (0.054) at least marginally support the 
inference of a positive reaction to these thirteen events.  t-statisticvs300 (1.450), however, does not 
support this inference.  For the three events decreasing adoption likelihood, untabulated results 
reveal a mean market-adjusted reaction of −0.0053 that is negative, as predicted, and 
                                                 
22 Results are similar for equal-weighted portfolio returns.   
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significantly different from zero based on all three statistics (t-statisticvs0 = −4.988; t-statisticvs300 
= −3.760; p-valuebootstrap = 0.008).   
  
Cross-Sectional Analysis 
Table 4, Panel A, presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in equation (1).  We 
estimate equation (1) using observations for which data are available for all sixteen events and 
for all 300 non-events (N = 31,296 firm-event observations for 1,956 firms).
23  Panel A reveals 
that 5.27% of the sample firms are banks and an average of 41.4% of firms’ outstanding shares 
are held by insiders.  Within-industry sales are relatively dispersed across firms (Herf = 0.035); 
61.25% of sample firms are domiciled in code law countries; and 74.18% of firms are audited by 
one of the four largest auditing firms.  The panel also reveals that almost 11% of firms have 
ADR listings, 43% previously applied international or US GAAP, and most firms list shares on 
only one exchange.  Table 4, Panel B, presents Pearson correlations between the variables.  
Consistent with our expectations, Panel B reveals that CMAR is significantly positively 
correlated with InfoQualFactor, InfoQualFactor*Bank, and CloselyHeld, and significantly 
negatively correlated with Turnover, Code, and Size.  The correlations between CMAR and Bank, 
Herf, and Big4 are not significantly different from zero. 
Table 5 presents regression summary statistics from equation (1), both excluding and 
including Size as a control variable.  The table also presents two test statistics for each coefficient 
estimate.  The first (in parentheses) is a t-statistic calculated using double-clustered standard 
errors based on industry and country.  The second (in brackets) is a t-statistic associated with a 
                                                 
23 Inferences are not affected when we estimate equation (1) using observations for which data are available for only 
all sixteen events (N = 32,848 firm-event observations for 2,053 firms).   
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test of whether event date coefficient estimates differ from non-event date coefficient 
estimates.
24 
Table 5 reveals that the coefficient on InfoQualFactor, β1, is positive and significantly 
different from zero, as predicted (coefficient = 0.0017, t-statistic = 5.81).  This indicates that 
market participants reacted more positively to IFRS adoption for firms with lower quality pre-
adoption information, consistent with investors in these firms expecting greater improvements in 
information quality.  Although the coefficient on Bank, β2, is not significantly different from 
zero (coefficient = 0.0002, t-statistic = 0.25), the coefficient on InfoQualFactor*Bank, β3, is 
positive and significantly different from zero (coefficient = 0.0017, t-statistic = 2.24).
25  This is 
consistent with investors in banks with lower pre-adoption information quality expecting net 
benefits associated with IFRS adoption.   
Table 5 also reveals that the coefficient on Turnover, β4, is negative and significantly 
different from zero (coefficient = –0.0023, t-statistic = –3.29) and the coefficient on CloselyHeld, 
β5, is positive and significantly different from zero (coefficient = 0.0031, t-statistic = 2.57).  
These findings are consistent with predictions that investors in firms with higher pre-adoption 
information asymmetry expected information asymmetry improvements from adoption of IFRS.  
Table 5 also reveals that the coefficient on Code, β7, is negative and significantly different from 
zero (coefficient = –0.0019, t-statistic = –4.11).  This finding is consistent with predictions that 
investors in firms domiciled in code law countries expected lower IFRS adoption benefits 
                                                 
24 Specifically, coefficient difference t-statistics (in brackets) are estimated for the same set of 1,956 firms using a 
stacked estimation of equation (1) for the sixteen event dates and for the 300 non-event dates. 
25 Untabulated findings from an analysis in which we replaced InfoQualFactor*Bank with Size*Bank reveal a 
significantly negative coefficient on the latter interaction variable of –0.0013 (t-statistic = –7.51), which is consistent 
with larger banks having an attenuated reaction to IFRS adoption.  That is, smaller banks, which are more likely to 
have lower quality pre-adoption information, have a more positive reaction to IFRS adoption.  Inferences relating to 
the other variables are the same as those obtained from Table 5.    
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because of enforcement concerns.  The coefficients on Herf, β6, and Big4, β8, are not 
significantly different from zero (coefficients = 0.0051 and 0.0000, t-statistics = 0.65 and 0.08).  
We obtain identical inferences when we compare event coefficient estimates with non-
event coefficient estimates (t-statisticvs300).  This indicates that our inferences are unlikely to 
reflect systematic associations between the firm characteristics and market returns that might be 
observed on non-event dates.  The second column of Table 5 also reveals that our inferences are 
not affected when Size is included as a control variable.   
 
Market Expectations Regarding Convergence Benefits 
Evidence thus far indicates that investors reacted positively to IFRS adoption events 
related to expectations of improvement in both information quality and information asymmetry.  
We now provide evidence on whether investor reactions also relate to expectations of 
convergence benefits. 
To implement this analysis, we estimate equation (1), but using dichotomous explanatory 
variables as follows.  We define LowInfoQualFactor as an indicator variable equal to one if the 
firm’s InfoQualFactor is above the sample median (that is, the firm has lower quality pre-
adoption information); LowTurnover as an indicator variable equal to one if the firm has below 
median share turnover; HighCloselyHeld as an indicator variable equal to one if the firm has 
above median insider share ownership; HighHerf as an indicator variable equal to one if the firm 
has above median industry sales concentration distribution; Code as an indicator variable equal 
to one if the firm is domiciled in a code law country; NonBig4 as an indicator variable equal to 
one if the firm does not have a Big 4 auditor; and SmallFirm as an indicator variable equal to one 
if the firm has below median firm size.  Each variable equals zero otherwise.    
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We define the variables in this way so that the intercept reflects the mean reaction for 
high quality pre-adoption information firms.  That is, the intercept reflects the mean reaction for 
those firms with higher quality information, higher turnover, lower percentage of closely held 
shares, lower industry sales concentration, domiciled in common law countries, using a Big 4 
auditor, and that are larger.  If investors in these firms expect IFRS adoption to provide little 
improvement in information quality for these firms, then any observed reaction to IFRS adoption 
events more likely reflects expected convergence benefits.  We do not include bank variables in 
this estimation because we do not have predictions for industry-specific variation in expected 
convergence benefits. 
Table 6 presents the findings.  Consistent with investors expecting convergence benefits, 
Table 6 reveals a positive and significant market reaction for firms with high quality information 
(intercept = 0.0048, t-statistic = 7.57).  Inferences relating to the other variables in Table 6 are 
consistent with those we obtain from Table 5, and are not affected by including size (SmallFirm) 
as a control variable.   
   
VI. SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
Alternative Pre-Adoption Information Quality Proxies 
To assess the robustness of our inferences with respect to InfoQualFactor, we estimate 
equation (1) separately for each variable used to derive the factor.  Columns 1 through 4 of Table 
7 present the results using ADR, Standards Applied, Exchanges, and Size, respectively.  
Consistent with Table 5, we multiply each proxy by minus one to allow us to interpret higher 
values as indicating lower quality pre-adoption information.  For two of the variables, Standards 
Applied and Size, Table 7 reveals findings consistent with those in Table 5 (Standards Applied 
coefficient = 0.0041, t-statistic = 6.09; Size coefficient = 0.0004, t-statistic = 2.72).  However, for  
  27
the other two variables, the coefficients are not significantly different from zero (ADR coefficient 
= 0.0013, t-statistic = 1.50; Exchanges coefficient = 0.0005, t-statistic = 1.61).  Table 7 also 
reveals that the coefficients on Bank and InfoQualProxy*Bank are positive and significantly 
different from zero for Standards Applied, Exchanges, and Size, but not for ADR.
26  Inferences 
relating to the other variables are the same as those obtained from Table 5.   
Evidence in Table 7 highlights the difficulty in isolating a single underlying variable that 
sufficiently captures pre-adoption information quality.  Creating a factor by using the four 
variables together to characterize a firm’s information quality, as in the estimation presented in 
Table 5, appears to improve our ability to capture this construct and, thus, increase the power of 
our test. 
 
Alternative Enforcement Environment Proxies 
Our primary cross-sectional analyses rely on the variable Code to assess whether the 
reaction to IFRS adoption differs for firms domiciled in code law and common law countries.  
We interpret Code as capturing the effect of weaker enforcement on expected benefits associated 
with IFRS adoption because the estimation equation includes controls for other firm 
characteristics, including the quality of pre-adoption information.  Nonetheless, it is possible that 
Code also captures other firm characteristics, including some related to the firm’s pre-adoption 
information quality.  Thus, to assess the robustness of our inferences related to enforcement, we 
re-estimate equation (1) using three alternative enforcement proxies.   
                                                 
26 The lack of significance for the ADR*Bank coefficient could result from the small number of observations 
underlying this coefficient estimation; only 12 banks in the sample have ADR listings.    
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The alternative proxies are Rule of Law, Control of Corruption, which we obtain from 
Kaufmann et al. (2007), and the average of these two variables, Average Enforcement.
27  Rule of 
Law is an annual country-specific measure of contract enforcement quality, and police and court 
system quality.  Control of Corruption is an annual country-specific measure of the extent to 
which public power is exercised for private gain and the degree of capture of the state by private 
interests.  We multiply the Kaufmann et al. (2007) variables by minus one so that larger values 
indicate weaker enforcement environments, analogous to the way we define Code.  Consistent 
with enforcement being weaker in code law countries, untabulated findings reveal that the 
correlation between Average Enforcement and Code is positive, 33.3%, and significantly 
different from zero.   
Table 8 presents the findings and reveals results consistent with those in Table 5.  
Specifically, the coefficients on all three enforcement variables are negative and marginally 
significantly different from zero: Rule of Law (coefficient = –0.0017, t-statistic = –1.84), Control 
of Corruption (coefficient = –0.0013, t-statistic = –1.70), and Average Enforcement (coefficient 
= –0.0015, t-statistic = –1.76).  Inferences relating to the other variables are similar to those 
obtained from Table 5.  Collectively, the findings in Table 8 support the inference that the 
market reaction is less positive for firms domiciled in jurisdictions likely to have weaker 
enforcement. 
 
Enforcement Interaction Effects 
A firm’s enforcement environment may affect the relation between IFRS adoption event 
returns and the variables in equation (1).  For example, the extent to which investors expect 
information asymmetry improvements from IFRS adoption may vary depending on their 
                                                 
27 The Kaufmann et al. (2007) variables vary over time and align better in calendar time with our study than do the 
non-time-varying measures provided by La Porta et al. (1998).  
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expectations relating to enforcement of the standards.  Because Code is our primary proxy for the 
enforcement environment, we estimate equation (1) separately for firms domiciled in code law 
and common law countries.  Untabulated tests for differences in coefficients between the two 
estimations, based on estimating stacked regressions, reveal no differences in coefficients for the 
two types of firms. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This study investigates the equity market reaction to sixteen events associated with the 
adoption of IFRS in Europe.  IFRS adoption resulted in a broad cross-section of firms domiciled 
in countries with a variety of domestic accounting standards changing to a common set of 
standards at the same time.  The prospects of IFRS adoption led investors in European firms to 
assess the implications of potential changes in firms’ information environments and convergence 
associated with this change in financial reporting standards.  Thus, events leading to IFRS 
adoption in Europe provide an opportunity to assess investors’ expectations about the net 
benefits or net costs of IFRS adoption.   
We first test for an overall market reaction to the IFRS adoption events.  We find that 
investors in European firms reacted positively to the adoption of IFRS, as reflected both in the 
aggregate market reaction for all events and in a positive reaction to thirteen events we assess as 
increasing the likelihood of IFRS adoption and a negative reaction to three events we assess as 
decreasing this likelihood.  These findings are consistent with investors perceiving that the 
benefits associated with IFRS adoption will outweigh the costs.  
We base our primary inferences on tests for cross-sectional differences in the market 
reaction to the IFRS adoption events.  Regarding expected changes in information environment, 
we find a more positive reaction for European firms with lower pre-adoption information quality  
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and higher pre-adoption information asymmetry.  These findings are consistent with investors 
expecting IFRS to improve the information environment for these firms.  We find an incremental 
positive reaction for banks with lower pre-adoption information quality, which is consistent with 
investors expecting improvements in information quality – including any associated with 
adoption of the controversial IAS 39 – for these firms.  We also find that investors react less 
positively for firms domiciled in code law countries, which are likely to have weaker 
enforcement of accounting standards.  Regarding expected convergence benefits, we find a 
positive reaction to IFRS adoption events even for firms with high quality pre-adoption 
information environments.  To the extent investors expect IFRS adoption to only minimally 
affect the information environments of these firms, this finding is consistent with investors 
expecting net benefits associated with convergence from IFRS adoption. 
Overall, our findings are consistent with investors expecting the benefits associated with 
IFRS adoption in Europe to exceed the expected costs.  Our findings indicate that investors 
expected net benefits associated with increases in information quality, decreases in information 
asymmetry, more rigorous enforcement of the standards, and convergence.  We leave it to future 
research to determine whether these expectations were fulfilled.  
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TABLE 1 
Events and Predicted Effects on Likelihood of European Adoption of IFRS 
 
Event Date  Description 
Assessed Effect 
on likelihood of 
IFRS adoption 
Predicted  
market reaction if  
IFRSbenefits > IFRScosts 
(IFRSbenefits < IFRScosts) 
March 12, 
2002 
European Parliament passes resolution 
requiring all EU listed companies to use 
IFRS by 2005 
Increase  +   (−) 
 
May 14, 2002  EFRAG issues draft recommendation to 
endorse all extant IFRS  
Increase  +   (−) 
June 19, 2002  EFRAG issues final recommendation to 
endorse all extant IFRS 
Increase  +   (−) 
July 4, 2003  Chirac sends letter to Prodi expressing 
concerns about IAS 39 and its potential 
negative effect on Europe 
Decrease  −   (+) 
July 9, 2003  Bolkestein sends letter to Tweedie 
supporting goal of adoption 
Increase  +   (−) 
July 16, 2003  ECOFIN and ARC support adoption of 
IFRS 
Increase  +   (−) 
September 29, 
2003 
EC endorses all extant IFRS, except IAS 
32 and IAS 39 
Increase  +   (−) 
February 3, 
2004 
Bolkestein pledges to postpone 
endorsement of IAS 32 and IAS 39 until 
issues are resolved; sets up consultative 
group to facilitate resolution 
Increase  +   (−) 
March 30, 
2004 
HSBC announces intentions to implement 
IAS 39 in full 
Increase  +   (−) 
June 4, 2004  EFRAG issues draft recommendation to 
endorse IAS 32 and IAS 39  
Increase  +   (−) 
July 8, 2004  EFRAG issues final recommendation to 
endorse IAS 32 and IAS 39 
Increase  +   (−) 
October 1, 
2004 
ARC recommends endorsement of IAS 
39, but recommends provisions relating to 
the fair value option and portfolio hedging 
of demand deposits be carved out 
Decrease  −   (+) 
November 19, 
2004 
EC endorses IAS 39 with both carve-out 
provisions 
Decrease  −   (+) 
June 16, 2005  IASB issues revised IAS 39 with new fair 
value option 
 
 
Increase  +   (−)  
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July 8, 2005  ARC recommends endorsement of revised 
fair value option, thereby eliminating one 
of the carve-outs 
Increase  +   (−) 
November 15, 
2005 
EC endorses revised fair value option, 
thereby eliminating one of the carve-outs 
Increase  +   (−) 
     
This table presents the sixteen events, our assessment of their effect on the likelihood of the 
European adoption of IFRS as issued by the IASB, and the predicted market reaction to each 
event.  In the last column, IFRSbenefits > IFRScosts refers to the predicted market reaction if 
expected benefits associated with IFRS adoption exceed expected costs.  IFRSbenefits < IFRScosts 
refers to the predicted market reaction if expected benefits associated with IFRS adoption are 
lower than expected costs. 
 
Key persons/organizations referred to in the event descriptions are defined as follows.   
-  ARC (Accounting Regulatory Committee) is a public-sector body that opines on EC 
proposals regarding international accounting standards, and is comprised of 
representatives from each member state of the European Union (EU), chaired by the EC.   
-  Bolkestein (Frits Bolkestein), a commissioner of the EC, is responsible for internal 
markets, taxation, and customs union. 
-  Chirac (Jacques Chirac) is the President of France. 
-  EC (European Commission) was created to represent the European interest common to all 
Member States of the EU, and has the right of initiative in the legislative process, i.e., it 
proposes the legislation on which the European Parliament and the Council decide to 
enact. 
-  ECOFIN (European and Financial Affairs Council) is comprised of the Economics and 
Finance ministers of the member states, and covers EU policy in several areas, including 
financial markets. 
-  EFRAG (European Financial Reporting Advisory Group) is a private-sector body created 
by the accounting profession within Europe, and advises the EC on the technical 
assessment of IASB-issued financial reporting standards. 
-  IASB (International Accounting Standards Board) is an independent, privately funded 
financial reporting standard setter charged with creating International Financial Reporting 
Standards. 
-  Prodi (Romano Prodi) is the President of the EC. 
-  Tweedie (Sir David Tweedie) is the Chairman of the IASB. 
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TABLE 2 
Sample Composition by Country 
 
Country Firms Total 
Obs 
Austria 39 624
Belgium   65 1,040
Czech Republic   5 80
Denmark   80 1,280
Finland 84 1,344
France 424 6,784
Germany   518 8,288
Greece 150 2,400
Ireland   32 512
Italy   202 3,232
Netherlands   109 1,744
Norway 74 1,184
Poland   45 720
Portugal 38 608
Spain   94 1,504
Sweden 187 2,992
Switzerland 149 2,384
UK   970 15,520
Total   3,265 52,240
     
This table presents the sample composition by country.  The sample includes all European firms 
with available data for all sixteen events in 2002 – 2005 listed in Table 1.   
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TABLE 3 
Overall Market Reaction to Events Affecting the Likelihood of IFRS Adoption in Europe 
 
Event Date  Description 
Predicted 
Sign 
Market 
Reaction 
Europe 
Market 
Reaction  
Rest of World  Difference 
March 12, 2002  European Parliament passes resolution requiring all EU listed 
companies to use IFRS by 2005   + –0.0116 −0.0136  0.0020 
May 14, 2002  EFRAG issues draft recommendation to endorse all extant IFRS   + 0.0199 0.0307  −0.0108 
June 19, 2002  EFRAG issues final recommendation to endorse all extant IFRS  + –0.0403 −0.0441  0.0038 
July 4, 2003  Chirac sends letter to Prodi expressing concerns about IAS 39 and its 
potential negative effect on Europe  −  0.0249 0.0317  −0.0068 
July 9, 2003  Bolkestein sends letter to Tweedie supporting adoption  + –0.0110 −0.0163  0.0053 
July 16, 2003  ECOFIN and ARC support adoption of IFRS  + –0.0132 −0.0163  0.0031 
September 29, 
2003 
EC endorses all extant IFRS, except IAS 32 and IAS 39  + –0.0210 −0.0191  −0.0019 
February 3, 
2004 
Bolkestein pledges to postpone endorsement of IAS 32 and IAS 39 
until issues are resolved; sets up consultative group to facilitate 
resolution 
+ –0.0026 −0.0123  0.0097 
March 30, 2004  HSBC announces intentions to implement IAS 39 in full  +  0.0090 0.0012  0.0078 
June 4, 2004  EFRAG issues draft recommendation to endorse IAS 32 and IAS 39  +  0.0181 0.0112  0.0069 
July 8, 2004  EFRAG issues final recommendation to endorse IAS 32 and IAS 39  +  −0.0006 −0.0098  0.0092 
October 1, 2004  ARC recommends endorsement of IAS 39, but recommends 
provisions relating to the fair value option and portfolio hedging of 
demand deposits be carved out 
−  0.0213 0.0272  −0.0059 
November 19, 
2004 
EC endorses IAS 39 with both carve-out provisions 
−  −0.0096 −0.0063  −0.0033 
June 16, 2005  IASB issues revised IAS 39 with new fair value option  + 0.0048 −0.0008  0.0056 
July 8, 2005  ARC recommends endorsement of revised fair value option, thereby 
eliminating one of the carve-outs  + 0.0067 0.0050  0.0017 
November 15,  EC endorses revised fair value option, thereby eliminating one of the  +  −0.0040 −0.0005  −0.0035  
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2005 carve-outs 
  Mean of Portfolio Event Returns 
t-statisticvs0 
t-statisticvs300 
p-valuebootstrap 
+ 
 
 
 
−0.0052 
 
 
 
−0.0086 
 
 
 
0.0034 
2.627 
1.980 
0.008 
     
This table presents three-day portfolio returns centered on the sixteen events identified as affecting the likelihood of IFRS adoption in 
Europe.  Market Reaction Europe is the three-day value-weighted return to the 3,265 European firm portfolio, centered on the event 
date.  Market Reaction Rest of World is the three-day value-weighted return to the 1,200 largest capitalized firms in the Americas and 
Asia/Pacific regions (DJ STOXX 1800 ex Europe Index), centered on the event date.  Predicted sign is based on the sign for the 
overall market reaction.  Mean of Portfolio Event Returns is computed as the mean of the individual date returns, where returns from 
events with a negative predicted sign are first multiplied by negative one.  t-statisticvs0 assesses whether the mean three-day event 
return differs from zero.  t-statisticvs300 assesses whether the mean three-day event return differs from the mean three-day return for 
300 non-overlapping non-events, chosen across the sample period 2002–2005.  p-valuebootstrap is the proportion of 500 draws for which 
the standardized mean three-day return across 16 randomly selected non-events exceeds the standardized mean three-day event return.  
Each draw of randomly selected non-events reflects the year-by-year distribution of events.  
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TABLE 4 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Distributions 
 
Variable Mean 25% 50% 75% Std 
Experimental Variables:   
  CMAR  0.0065 −0.0117 0.0059 0.0249 0.0389 
  InfoQualFactor  0.0002 0.3704 0.5020 0.5613 1.0001 
  Bank  0.0527 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2234 
  InfoQualFactor*Bank  0.0090 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2216 
  Turnover  0.5009 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.5000 
  CloselyHeld  0.4143 0.2009 0.4122 0.6116 0.2572 
  Herf  0.0344 0.0114 0.0210 0.0422 0.0381 
  Code  0.6125 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.4872 
  Big4  0.7418 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.4376 
  Size   5.3352 3.8271 5.1880 6.7497 2.1347 
Descriptive Variables:   
  ADR  0.1074 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3096 
  Standards Applied  0.4316 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4316 
  Exchanges  1.3405 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.7973 
 
Panel B: Pearson correlations 
 
  CMAR InfoQualFactor  Bank  InfoQualFactor
*Bank  Turnover CloselyHeld  Herf  Code  Big4 
InfoQualFactor  0.050           
Bank  0.003  0.040         
InfoQualFactor*Bank  0.020 0.222 0.173       
Turnover  −0.028  0.089  −0.034  −0.020       
CloselyHeld  0.026  −0.042  −0.019  −0.019  −0.494    
Herf  0.006  −0.013  −0.087  −0.026  0.014 0.012   
Code  −0.021  −0.296  0.070  0.003  −0.317  0.308  −0.102 
Big4  −0.001  −0.013  0.103 0.162  0.162  −0.169  −0.034  0.061
Size  −0.036  −0.071  0.200 0.023  0.203  −0.199  −0.023  0.213 0.400 
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This table presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the cross-sectional analyses.  Panel A presents distributions, and 
Panel B presents Pearson correlations.  In both panels, N = 31,296.  CMAR is the firm’s cumulative market-adjusted return, measured 
as the three-day return centered on the event date minus the three-day return to the DJ STOXX 1800 ex Europe Index.  
InfoQualFactor is the quality of the firm’s pre-adoption information environment, measured as the highest eigenvalue factor derived 
from principal components analysis of the variables ADR, Standards Applied, Exchanges, and Size.  InfoQualFactor is multiplied by 
negative one to ease interpretation, where higher values of InfoQualFactor indicate lower quality pre-adoption information.  ADR is 
an indicator variable that equals one if a firm cross-lists in the US using American Depository Receipts during the event year, and zero 
otherwise.  Standards Applied is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm applies US standards or International Accounting 
Standards during the event year, and zero if the firm applies domestic standards.  Exchanges is the number of exchanges in which the 
firm lists during the event year.  Size is the log of the firm’s prior end of year market value of equity.  Bank is an indicator variable 
equal to one if the firm’s primary two-digit SIC code is 60 or 61, and zero otherwise.  Turnover is an indicator variable equal to one if 
the firm’s mean daily percentage shares traded during the year is above the median for all firms, and zero otherwise.  CloselyHeld is 
the percentage of the firm’s shares outstanding held by insiders at the end of the fiscal year.  Herf is the Herfindahl Index, measured as 
the sum of each firm’s squared percentage market-share, calculated at the two-digit industry level.  Code is an indicator variable equal 
to one if the firm is domiciled in a country with a code-based legal system (all countries except the UK and Ireland), and zero 
otherwise.  Big4 is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm was audited by one of the four largest accounting firms, and zero 
otherwise.  In Panel B, bolded values indicate significance at the 5% level for two-tailed tests.   
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TABLE 5 
Cross-Sectional Analysis 
 
 
 
Variable 
 
Predicted 
Sign 
 CMAR 
(t-statistic) 
[t-statisticvs300] 
 CMAR 
(t-statistic) 
[t-statisticvs300] 
    
Intercept 
 
+   0.0073 
(7.64) 
[8.33] 
0.0088 
(8.56) 
[6.15] 
InfoQualFactor 
 
+   0.0017 
(5.81) 
[4.37] 
0.0017 
(5.92) 
[5.86] 
Bank 
 
+/–     0.0002 
(0.25) 
[0.20] 
0.0008 
(1.16) 
[0.37] 
InfoQualFactor*Bank  +/–   0.0017 
(2.24) 
[2.15] 
0.0017 
(2.28) 
[2.17] 
Turnover 
 
–  −0.0023 
(−3.29) 
[−4.92] 
−0.0020 
(−2.86) 
[−4.52] 
CloselyHeld 
 
+   0.0031 
(2.57) 
[1.78] 
0.0025 
(2.10) 
[1.72] 
Herf 
 
+   0.0051 
(0.65) 
[0.57] 
0.0058 
(0.66) 
[0.56] 
Code 
 
–  −0.0019 
(−4.11) 
[−5.32] 
−0.0013 
(−2.43) 
[−4.46] 
Big4 
 
+   0.0000 
(0.08) 
[0.00] 
0.0007 
(1.62) 
[0.24] 
Size 
 
–     −0.0005 
(−3.15) 
[−0.05] 
Firm-events 
Firms 
R
2 
   31,296 
1,956 
3.11% 
31,296 
1,956 
3.15% 
      
  42
This table presents results from cross-sectional analyses examining the market reaction for 16 
events affecting the likelihood of IFRS adoption in Europe.  The estimation is an OLS regression 
of the following form:  
 
CMARj,e = β0 + β1InfoQualFactorj,e + β2Bankj,e + β3InfoQualFactorj,e*Bankj,e  
+ β4Turnoverj,e + β5CloselyHeldj,e + β6Herfj,e + β7Codej,e + β8Big4j,e + ρj,e   
 
CMAR is the firm’s cumulative market-adjusted return, measured as the three-day return 
centered on the event date minus the three-day return to the DJ STOXX 1800 ex Europe Index.  
InfoQualFactor is the quality of the firm’s pre-adoption information environment, measured as 
the highest eigenvalue factor derived from principal components analysis of the variables ADR, 
Standards Applied, Exchanges, and Size.  InfoQualFactor is multiplied by negative one to ease 
interpretation, where higher values of InfoQualFactor indicate lower quality pre-adoption 
information.  ADR is an indicator variable that equals one if a firm cross-lists in the US using 
American Depository Receipts during the event year, and zero otherwise.  Standards Applied is 
an indicator variable equal to one if the firm applies US standards or International Accounting 
Standards during the event year, and zero if the firm applies domestic standards.  Exchanges is 
the number of exchanges in which the firm lists during the event year.  Size is the log of the 
firm’s prior end of year market value of equity.  Bank is an indicator variable equal to one if the 
firm’s primary two-digit SIC code is 60 or 61, and zero otherwise.  Turnover is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the firm’s mean daily percentage shares traded during the year is above 
the median for all firms, and zero otherwise.  CloselyHeld is the percentage of the firm’s shares 
outstanding held by insiders at the end of the fiscal year.  Herf is the Herfindahl Index, measured 
as the sum of each firm’s squared percentage market-share, calculated at the two-digit industry 
level.  Code is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is domiciled in a country with a 
code-based legal system (all countries except the UK and Ireland), and zero otherwise.  Big4 is 
an indicator variable equal to one if the firm was audited by one of the four largest accounting 
firms, and zero otherwise.   
 
t-statistic is in parenthesis and is the regression coefficient scaled by the coefficient standard 
error corrected with two-digit SIC code and country double-clustering (Petersen 2007).  t-
statisticvs300 is in brackets and is derived from comparing the coefficient estimated in a regression 
of 1,956 firms across the 16 event dates to the coefficient estimated in a regression of 1,956 
firms’ 300 non-overlapping non-event dates.  
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TABLE 6 
Market Expectations Regarding Convergence Benefits 
 
 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign 
 CMAR 
(t-statistic) 
 CMAR 
(t-statistic) 
    
Intercept  +   0.0048 
(7.57) 
0.0037 
(5.30) 
LowInfoQualFactor 
 
+   0.0019 
(2.22) 
0.0025 
(3.51) 
LowTurnover 
 
+   0.0026 
(3.70) 
0.0024 
(3.29) 
HighCloselyHeld 
 
+   0.0017 
(2.91) 
0.0015 
(2.68) 
HighHerf 
 
+   0.0006 
(0.64) 
0.0006 
(0.61) 
Code 
 
–  −0.0030 
(−5.61) 
−0.0026 
(−4.18) 
NonBig4 
 
+   0.0003 
(0.69) 
0.0002 
(0.34) 
SmallFirm 
 
+     0.0019 
(2.65) 
        
Firm-events 
Firms 
R
2 
   31,296 
1,956 
2.97% 
31,296 
1,956 
3.01% 
     
This table presents results from cross-sectional analyses examining the market reaction for 16 
events affecting the likelihood of IFRS adoption in Europe.  The estimation is an OLS regression 
of the following form:  
 
CMARj,e = γ0 + γ1LowInfoQualFactorj,e + γ2LowTurnoverj,e + γ3HighCloselyHeldj,e +  
γ4HighHerfj,e + γ5Codej,e + γ6NonBig4j,e + τj,e.   
 
CMAR is the firm’s cumulative market-adjusted return, measured as the three-day return 
centered on the event date minus the three-day return to the DJ STOXX 1800 ex Europe Index.  
LowInfoQualFactor is a dichotomous variable that equals one if InfoQualFactor is at or above 
the distribution median (indicating low pre-adoption information quality), and equals zero 
otherwise.  InfoQualFactor is the quality of the firm’s pre-adoption information environment, 
measured as the highest eigenvalue factor derived from principal components analysis of the 
variables ADR, Standards Applied, Exchanges, and Size.  InfoQualFactor is multiplied by 
negative one to ease interpretation, where higher values of InfoQualFactor indicate lower quality  
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pre-adoption information.  ADR is an indicator variable that equals one if a firm cross-lists in the 
US using American Depository Receipts (ADR) during the event year, and zero otherwise.  
Standards Applied is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm applies US standards or 
International Accounting Standards during the event year, and zero if the firm applied domestic 
standards.  Exchanges is the number of exchanges in which the firm lists during the event year.  
Size is the log of the firm’s prior end of year market value of equity.  LowTurnover is an 
indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s mean daily percentage shares traded during the year 
is below the median for all firms, and zero otherwise.  HighCloselyHeld is a dichotomous 
variable that equals one if the percentage of the firm’s shares outstanding held by insiders at the 
end of the fiscal year is at or above the distribution median, and zero otherwise.  HighHerf is a 
dichotomous variable that equals one if the sum the firm’s squared percentage market-share is at 
or above the distribution median of the Herfindahl index, calculated at the two-digit industry 
level, and zero otherwise.  Code is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is domiciled in a 
country with a code-based legal system (all countries except the UK and Ireland), and zero 
otherwise.  NonBig4 is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm was not audited by one of 
the four largest accounting firms, and zero otherwise.  SmallFirm is a dichotomous variable that 
equals one if Size is below the distribution median, and zero otherwise.   
 
t-statistic is in parenthesis and is the regression coefficient scaled by the coefficient standard 
error corrected with two-digit SIC code and country double-clustering (Petersen 2007).    
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TABLE 7 
Alternative Information Quality Proxies 
 
   Proxy for Pre-Adoption Information Quality 
 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign 
 
ADR 
Standards 
Applied 
 
Exchanges 
 
Size 
Intercept 
 
+ 0.0079 
(7.27) 
0.0081 
(8.22) 
0.0083 
(7.75) 
0.0092 
(6.49) 
InfoQualProxy 
 
+ 0.0013 
(1.50) 
0.0041 
(6.09) 
0.0005 
(1.61) 
0.0004 
(2.72) 
Bank 
 
+/–   0.0009 
(1.26) 
0.0015 
(2.07) 
0.0029 
(3.34) 
0.0081 
(4.82) 
InfoQualProxy*Bank  +/–  −0.0001 
(−0.02) 
0.0047 
(2.65) 
0.0014 
(3.12) 
0.0009 
(3.84) 
Turnover 
 
–  −0.0022 
(−3.19) 
−0.0023 
(−3.30) 
−0.0023 
(−3.37) 
−0.0019 
(−2.88) 
CloselyHeld 
 
+ 0.0033 
(2.43) 
0.0029 
(2.48) 
0.0034 
(2.62) 
0.0029 
(1.98) 
Herf 
 
+ 0.0032 
(0.38) 
0.0049 
(0.62) 
0.0027 
(0.33) 
0.0034 
(0.36) 
Code 
 
–  −0.0029 
(−5.05) 
−0.0017 
(−3.46) 
−0.0028 
(−5.21) 
−0.0024 
(−3.41) 
Big4 
 
+ 0.0001 
(0.27) 
0.0001 
(0.32) 
0.0001 
(0.20) 
0.0007 
(1.44) 
Firm-days 
Firms 
R
2 
  31,296 
1,956 
2.92% 
31,296 
1,956 
3.13% 
31,296 
1,956 
2.93% 
31,296 
1,956 
2.97% 
     
This table presents results from cross-sectional analyses examining the market reaction for 16 
events affecting the likelihood of IFRS adoption in Europe.  The estimation is an OLS regression 
of the following form:  
 
CMARj,e = δ0 + δ1 InfoQualProxyj,e + δ2 Bankj,e + δ3 InfoQualProxyj,e*Bankj,e  
+ δ4 Turnoverj,e + δ5 CloselyHeldj,e + δ6 Herfj,e+ δ7 Codej,e + δ8 Big4j,e + υj,e.   
 
CMAR is the firm’s cumulative market-adjusted return, measured as the three-day return 
centered on the event date minus the three-day return to the DJ STOXX1800 ex Europe Index.  
InfoQualProxy is the proxy for the quality of the firm’s pre-adoption information environment, 
alternatively measured as ADR, Standards Applied, Exchanges, and Size.  Each proxy is 
multiplied by negative one to ease interpretation (implying higher values indicate lower quality 
pre-adoption information).  ADR is an indicator variable that equals one if a firm cross-lists in  
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the US using American Depository Receipts during the event year, and zero otherwise.  
Standards Applied is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm applies US standards or 
International Accounting Standards during the event year, and zero if the firm applies domestic 
standards.  Exchanges is the number of exchanges in which the firm lists during the event year.  
Size is the log of the firm’s prior end of year market value of equity.  Bank is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the firm’s primary two-digit SIC code is 60 or 61, and zero otherwise.  
Turnover is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s mean daily percentage shares traded 
during the year is above the median for all firms, and zero otherwise.  CloselyHeld is the 
percentage of the firm’s shares outstanding held by insiders at the end of the fiscal year.  Herf is 
the Herfindahl Index, measured as the sum of each firm’s squared percentage market-share, 
calculated at the two-digit industry level.  Code is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is 
domiciled in a country with a code-based legal system (all countries except the UK and Ireland), 
and zero otherwise.  Big4 is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm was audited by one of 
the four largest accounting firms, and zero otherwise.   
 
t-statistic is in parenthesis and is the regression coefficient scaled by the coefficient standard 
error corrected with two-digit SIC code and country double-clustering (Petersen 2007).    
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TABLE 8 
Alternative Enforcement Environment Proxies 
 
   Proxy for Enforcement Environment (Enf_Environ) 
 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign 
Rule of  
Law 
Control of  
Corruption 
Average 
Enforcement 
Intercept 
 
+ 0.0034 
(1.86) 
0.0038 
(2.48) 
0.0036 
(2.17) 
InfoQualFactor 
 
+ 0.0020 
(7.31) 
0.0020 
(7.17) 
0.0020 
(7.23) 
Bank 
 
+/–   0.0003 
(0.40) 
0.0003 
(0.41) 
0.0003 
(0.41) 
InfoQualFactor*Bank  +/– 0.0014 
(1.82) 
0.0014 
(1.85) 
0.0014 
(1.84) 
Turnover 
 
–  −0.0019 
(−2.69) 
−0.0019 
(−2.75) 
−0.0019 
(−2.72) 
CloselyHeld 
 
+ 0.0028 
(2.38) 
0.0028 
(2.47) 
0.0028 
(2.44) 
Herf 
 
+ 0.0071 
(0.89) 
0.0067 
(0.85) 
0.0069 
(0.86) 
Enf_Environ 
 
– –0.0017 
(–1.84) 
–0.0013 
(–1.70) 
–0.0015 
(–1.76) 
Big4 
 
+  −0.0001 
(−0.33) 
−0.0002 
(−0.34) 
−0.0001 
(−0.34) 
Firm-days 
Firms 
R
2 
  31,296 
1,956 
3.09% 
31,296 
1,956 
3.09% 
31,296 
1,956 
3.09% 
     
This table presents results from cross-sectional analyses examining the market reaction for 16 
events affecting the likelihood of IFRS adoption in Europe.  The estimation is an OLS regression 
of the following form:  
 
CMARj,e = θ0 + θ1InfoQualFactorj,e + θ2Bankj,e + θ3InfoQualFactorj,e*Bankj,e  
       + θ4Turnoverj,e + θ5CloselyHeldj,e + θ6Herfj,e+ θ7Enf_Environj,e + θ8Big4j,e + ϖj,e.   
 
CMAR is the firm’s cumulative market-adjusted return, measured as the three-day return 
centered on the event date minus the three-day return to the DJ STOXX 1800 ex Europe Index.  
InfoQualFactor is the quality of the firm’s pre-adoption information environment, measured as 
the highest eigenvalue factor derived from principal components analysis of the variables ADR, 
Standards Applied, Exchanges, and Size.  InfoQualFactor is multiplied by negative one to ease 
interpretation, where higher values of InfoQualFactor indicate lower quality pre-adoption  
  48
information.  ADR is an indicator variable that equals one if a firm cross-lists in the US using 
American Depository Receipts during the event year, and zero otherwise.  Standards Applied is 
an indicator variable equal to one if the firm applies US standards or International Accounting 
Standards during the event year, and zero if the firm applies domestic standards.  Exchanges is 
the number of exchanges in which the firm lists during the event year.  Size is the log of the 
firm’s prior end of year market value of equity.  Bank is an indicator variable equal to one if the 
firm’s primary two-digit SIC code is 60 or 61, and zero otherwise.  Turnover is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the firm’s mean daily percentage shares traded during the year is above 
the median for all firms, and zero otherwise.  CloselyHeld is the percentage of the firm’s shares 
outstanding held by insiders at the end of the fiscal year.  Herf is the Herfindahl Index, measured 
as the sum of each firm’s squared percentage market-share, calculated at the two-digit industry 
level.  Enf_Environ is one of three proxies for the firm’s enforcement environment, derived 
annually at the country level from Kaufmann et al. (2007).  To ease interpretation, the Kaufmann 
et al. (2007) measures are multiplied by negative one so that larger values indicate weaker 
enforcement.  Rule of Law measures the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the 
courts.  Control of Corruption measures the extent to which public power is exercised for private 
gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by 
elites and private interests.  Average Enforcement is the average of these two variables.  Big4 is 
an indicator variable equal to one if the firm was audited by one of the four largest accounting 
firms, and zero otherwise. 
 
t-statistic is in parenthesis and is the regression coefficient scaled by the coefficient standard 
error corrected with two-digit SIC code and country double-clustering (Petersen 2007). 
 
  